PHIL4205 - Derrida and Levinas on Responsibility

If the word "responsibility" does not make you cringe then you probably have not had to endure the agony of being responsible. On occasion you can find me slacking off from my duties either at school or home which may give the impression that I have found a way to live comfortably indifferent to the subject. This is far from the truth. I am always conscious of the responsibilities I have failed to meet both past and present, they haunt me like the ghosts of Ebenezer Scrooge that force him to relive what he had once cast out. It can at times be overwhelming how a guilty feeling can swell up and make suspect a tranquil moment. I can never evade responsibility.

Responsibility always seems to involve an other of some sort whether they are the one who benefit, suffer, or judge my actions. Without the existence of the other could responsibility really be possible or meaningful? Is it possible to be responsible for myself in any way that didn't involve an other? What about irresponsibility? Is it merely failing to deliver on a promise? A thoughtless act at an other's expense? Or is it a lack of relating to an other?

After posing the former questions, I could not help but look towards my own life for examples of where the intention of evading actually reinforced a feeling of responsibility. For instance, when I first started this blog it was merely to get into the practice of writing on a consistent basis. It was because of my own shame as a writer, the inadequacy of my being "as such", that encouraged me to stop dwelling in disappointment of the naivety of self-denial. At the point when I felt I had finally broke-in these new shoes, I suddenly came to the realization that nothing I had written was for me but rather it was for others. It was my only critic/reader Gary Smith (a.k.a The Ontological Boy) who brought this into focus for me. He questioned first my "philosophy", as crudely sketched out as it is, and pointed out continuities between my subjects and writing style. There was often a sense of elation in our exchanges for a month. Each response was followed by a more thought provoking one until I finally withdrew to silence. I did so not because of any offence I felt in Gary reading my work, nor any fatigue from the labor involved, but because I knew that there was the real possibility that I would in the future disappoint the other - I would once again fail to live up to my responsibility to him. As I remained in silence, Gary continued to write daily and comment on my work, sometimes leaving a staggering 30 posts in one month. The comments and posts seemed to urge me to respond, but I remained in my silence. Although we never knew each other, or the many other Others who might stumble across this blog, this unlikely and impossible relationship continued to be a source of judgment that placed my contributions into perspective. One never writes to oneself but always for the purpose of addressing others. This withdrawal brought on by the tremendous debt of responsibility felt in proximity is something to this day I can never hope to repay.

I was strangely comforted by two texts from class, Levinas' Otherwise Than Being and Derrida's Gift of Death. The two essays spoke to me about responsibility, Levinas from an operational account and Derrida from an absolute account of responsibility.

Levinas in Otherwise Than Being explains that our passivity or susceptibility to an irreducible Other places us in a position of responsibility which we would have not chosen or willed for ourselves. In this relation to an Other, a relation that comes before the concept of an "I" or "self" can be formed, we are in Levinas' words "innocent" but also "accused", "persecuted", and held "hostage" by this Other. This responsibility does not come from an appeal to moral virtues such as duty or honor; rather we are responsible to the Other because it addresses us first and has priority over the "self". The relation to Other as pre-ontological separates ethics from morality which is a later phenomena formed in concepts. Levinas also describes the relation to the Other asymmetrical. In coming always before me, asymmetry of the relation to the Other comes in the way it makes demands before we respond. We only come to the point of responding when in proximity to the "face" of the Other. In such a way we are forced into a position of responsibility to respond. Though the ways we respond to the Other may vary, it is always something owed to the Other. The responsibility to the Other is a key component to what Levinas has to say about alterity and its role in the formation of self. It is because of the Other that I can have the experience of things outside of the self. In terms of transcendence and its role in being, "in the face of the Other, I always demand more of myself". This formulation of responsibility radically changes the focus on ethical philosophy away from the active, conscious, self, and places it instead with the Other who places us in the position of responsibility.

Derrida in his essay Gift of Death reinterprets the story of Abraham as an example of responsibility. We might think it is strange that Abraham is used as an example of what it means to be responsible because from most accounts he is acting irresponsibly in agreeing to murder his son. Taking off from Kierkegaard assessment of the story as confirmation of subjective truth, Derrida interprets Abraham's decision to sacrifice Isaac as illustrating the paradox of responsibility. Abraham is torn between being faithful to God and the love of his only child. No matter which he obeys he must at the same time sacrifice the other. Moreover, in committing the act of murder he is violating moral law. Our responsibility for the Other in Derrida's view, whether the absolute Other (God) or a more immediate other, is always without justification and irresolvable but it is the basis from which the foundation of ethics is laid. Proximity is not as vital for Derrida as it is for Levinas. From Derrida's perspective there is always an Other no matter how remote they may be. In choosing to feed the cat that lives in my home or the hundreds of strays, I have no valid reason to privilege one act from another. Professor Jowett often repeats a quote from Derrida that I've grown fond of from this essay: "every Other is every bit Other". At the last moment, with his arm raises to strike
Isaac, the angel of God held Abraham back. In sacrificing that which is closest and which is loved over to the Other, Abraham in return recieved Isaac. It is in giving up our entitlement to sacrifice, which is always unjustified and inadequate, we learn to be grateful for the Other in its Otherness.

In terms of what this all means for my earlier questions about irresponsible, I am never at any time without responsibility. That is however not a sentence to a predestine fate that I can inadequately address or sufficiently justify my actions but rather it is a consequence of my being here in the world. As a closing remark, I've begun the work of completing and publishing the posts from my period of silence. Thank you for everything Gary.