Today in class we discussed the differences between Sartre's and De Beauvoir's account of the Other. While Sartre maintains a conflicted view of the relation to the Other, which he describes as "hell" in his play No Exit, De Beauvoir has a much more sympathetic view of the relation to the Other as a possibility that occurs because of our existence in the world. Despite their differences both describe the existential condition that forces us to acknowledge the existence of Others.
One could make the argument that the differences between Sartre's and De Beauvoir's regard for the Other differs in their consideration of ethics. While Sartre's radical individualism has secured him the title of the last true "Cartisian Rationalist" and concieves of the conscious "self" as seperate from the Other, De Beauvoir's consideration of the relation to an Other places ethics within the frame of existential philosophy. I am somewhat resistant to these valuations not only on the principle that doing so understates the similarities by too sharp a contrast, but that existential philosophy at its foundation is a recognition of the individual in their life that is not based on any fixed or given meaning. As such, we must recognize that both Sartre and De Beauvoir are describing different but equal perspectives in their closeness to the subject of existence.
The two thinkers share equal perspectives of the same phenomena of existence. Sartre can be said to describe it from the perspective of the "self" while De Beauvoir describes it from the perspective of a self that has been "othered". Either way you consider existence it is still the result of "being" under consideration. For Sartre the Other existing in the world places constraints on the individual will - not merely in a physical sense but in the consciousness for-itself being aggravated by the Other who makes the self notice its own separation. He describes this condition as a kind of subjegation to the Other whose "gaze" judges and makes apparent what is incalculable and external to the self. We are transformed into objects of the Other's will and have no control over how, or if, they regard us. Alternatively, De Bouvoir, from the perspective of the self that has been Othered, considers what the self is left with in its relation to Others. While there is a limit to the possibility of what the self can impose on the Other, it ultimately must accept the freedom of the Other in order for the possibility affirm its own freedom of transcendence outside itself. According to De Bouvoir, the recognition of this solidarity between the self and Other is not only the first point of departure for any transcendence but the very condition of one's own existence which originates in the ethical relation.
Unlike objects in the world, conscious beings are in a constant state of transcendence. From the Sartrian perspective this transcendence occurs in and through the resistance of an Other, while De Beauvoir recognizes the irreducibility of the Other that comes from a recognition of individual subjectivity or freedom. While I think there are notable differences in the temperament between the two philosophers, the Other still is part of the ongoing narrative of transcendence within existence - its limit or possibility. The Other is both a point of resistance and the result of a collective relational being. It is because of the irresolvable relation to the Other that the individual can have the possibility of existence as being-in-the-world.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)

1 comment:
The other. It has been thought by many that I am a writer or a philosopher. I have even thought so myself sometimes. Yes, it is true that there is a Gary Smith that thinks and who is a philosopher, but he is somehow other than I. That is not, I think, such a remarkable observation. That person, who I am (!), seems to me, at times, to be a character in a story. Maybe the story of the world. I somehow have to be him. I am him. But I am also distant from him. He is other.
I think I am not so different from others in thinking this. Would William Shakespeare be able to see himself as the great SHAKESPEARE? Would … (think here of a "great" person seeing himself as That Thing he has become). We become, or "are", other than the bare thing we are, even for the rest of us who are not great. The Form rides high over the particular. Most of us want to be good looking or intelligent or talented. And most of us, for a moment, can maybe see that in ourselves … but we know it will quickly vanish and we realize that the Form only visited us for a flash and then it's gone. I imagine that Obama is bewildered, at times, that he is OBAMA, THE PRESIDENT. The same with Steven Hawking and a beautiful star or a serial killer. We are taken back by being what we are. We can even see that the Form that is displayed out there is other than ourselves. We are our own other. And we are fascinated. Each of us, I surmise, would love to meet our Self, our Form, alone in a room and have a lengthy chat. The self with its Self. Is it true that we can, each of us, really be what we are? I doubt it. The internal division is too strong. It has ontological depth. And that inner Cut is finally what we are. I am neither writer nor philosopher, and I watch myself having to be both. I write but I have written nothing. I think but I have not managed to think one simple thought. It has all come to me. But from where? From the self of my self, other than my self. From God? From a bad dream? Or do I deceive my self that there came anything at all? I do at times love that person who is Gary Smith and I wish I could meet him and talk far into the night. It's a great entanglement and I wonder how we are ever going to figure out where ethical responsibility lies. Sometimes a retreat is necessary.
Post a Comment