Emmanuel Kant: Ethical Apriori

Method - Introduction

Emanuel Kant's The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals attempts to establish a basis for ethics that comes from an apriori description, a form of analysis referred to as “Pure” philosophy. Kant's interest in approaching ethics through this descriptive method comes from his dissatisfaction with the many ethical views that claim universal agreement yet remain fixed on a particular means (i.e. Christian’s sanctification or the utilitarian’s calculus). What made these approaches unsuitable for Kant is that they did not speak of an essentially good ethic removed from the contingency of desire or external objective; in other words for a long time ethics failed to consider the more general condition of the rational being and their capacity to make moral judgments. This is not to suggest that Kant thought such a rational ethic could replace other moral views. Instead Kant wished to orient the question away from "what is morality?" to ask instead "how can we be moral?" Supposing that is such a principle of ethics based on the level of judgment, the shortfalls of making inferences based on examples of actions, convention, or inclination requires that we exclude these factors in order to reach a more essential feature of judgment. For this reason, Kant's focus on an apriori foundation is not to suggest that ethics exist independently from what can be known empirically or acted upon practically, rather his investigation is to determine the necessary conditions needed for any rational being to be moral.

I've identified three major points addressed within The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant uses to support the claim that there is an apriori foundation of morality for the rational being.

1) Existence of the Good Will
2) Respect of Law through Duty
3) Freedom as incalculable

All of the above points mentioned function to both describe the conditions of moral judgment and how it arises from self-autonomy. The apriori portion is based in our capacity to legislate moral law which shall be discussed in further depth as we continue.

Good Will

Kant states in The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that "Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL.” (p.9). If we were to focus on our basic notions of ethics as an obligation to do good onto others or ourselves, in all of the conventions of ethics the good is a universal principle that is a factor in every end. As for the will, we would be better to regard it as the means of bring about good in the world. Ethics happens when the both of these factors are present. This is not to say that there is no separation to be drawn between the “good” and the “will” for they are both towards the same end.

There are two reasons for Kant’s view of ethics to be fundamentally based in this good will that is beyond qualification. Firstly, a good that is without qualification is an essence and must always come before any particular result. Kant goes on to state that "the good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because of its willing i.e., it is good in itself" (p.10). It is because of this concern for the “good in itself” that we recognize what Kant means when he says that we are to will what is against what we would otherwise do or against social convention. To truly become aware of the will, one needs to exclude all possible inclinations that could interfere with a rendering of the end that is the good will.
Secondly, that which is called the "good in itself" entails that it is not only essential but also autonomous. Kant regards autonomy as the ability to legislate for oneself. The good will is autonomous because it is of the good that is essential in every end and can never be subject to any means or intended outcome. Though the good can be brought about in variety of different ways, if we are to understand ethics as regard for the good it must be oriented to one point of reference.

Duty and Law

Kant’s interest in establishing apriori foundations does not remove itself entirely from a consideration of the means that make ethics possible. In particular, the faculty of reason plays an important role as the means in Kant’s ethical philosophy. To demonstrate the role of reason, Kant points to a concept such as duty to explain how reason correspondence to the good. For example, Kant mentions the duty of a merchant to treat customers fairly and sell product at an equal price. The customer is served by the honesty of the merchant and it is also to the merchant’s advantage to behave in a professional manner. But this is not in accordance with one’s duty to the good for there are many other incentives for him to behave in such a way. Kant contrasts this example with one that demonstrates an action done for the sake of duty. For example, individuals who suffer under the adversities and hopelessness may come to the conclusion that to relieve their suffering would be best served by ending their life. But instead, if in spite of the desire for death they preserve their life they have conformed to duty that is against their own self-interest thus their actions have moral merit.

Although these examples are quite limited in their application, what is a consistent theme is that they demonstrate a relation and non-relation to a good end. As was the case with the examples above, Kant’s interest in determining how actions can have moral worth bring him to offer three propositions used to assess whether an action is in accordance with the good. The first is that an action must be done from duty. The first example of the merchant demonstrates this principle well because it is not made clear whether honesty had been offered out of duty or if there were other factors that could explain the decision to be honest. Secondly, the moral worth of an action of duty is not in the purpose to be achieved but the maxim it is determined by. The second example of the individual duty to the preservation of life comes out of a maxim that is opposed to their self-interest to end suffering. In fact, we might even say as a principle of acting in accordance with the good will one ought to do what they would not otherwise wish to do for themselves. And thirdly, “duty is the necessity to do an action from respect for law” (p.16). While the first two propositions were conditions of the good will that have already been addressed, in emphasizing duty as “respect” for law Kant is trying to identify how the moral subject is effected by the law. It should first be pointed out that law is for Kant as objective as nature itself. Law cannot contradict itself and does not offer any manner of choice. Kant states that “we are always subject to law, [thus] respect can be regarded as the effect of law on the subject and not as the cause of law” (p.17). In describing law as a condition of nature, law is a constraint placed upon the will and acted upon as duty in the good. Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws i.e. according to principles proscribe by nature. Because nature provides us with an objective point of reference which our ethical decisions are based upon, it is ultimately up to the rational being to act in accordance with law. A being that is not possessed with a rational capacity cannot be ethical for it always implies that there is a regard for law. Not every rational being will be able to account for every variable of law but it is the maxim that is willed that is ethically significant.

Freedom

Kant’s understanding of the foundation of ethical judgment comes from an ability of the rational being to consider the concept of freedom employed by reason. According to Kant, the subject exists in a division between an intelligible world where its actions are equated with causality and a sensual world where it is belonging to the world. Because this intelligible world view regards also the sensual and thus what is in accordance to the laws of nature, Kant regards the laws of the intelligible as “imperatives” for the subject that are foundational in determining its will (p.71). Imperatives are described as commandments of reason that constrain the will. The imperative, unlike the laws of nature, ask one to consider what one “ought” to do but it is not a law that binds the unconditional will within its subjective constitution (p.29). Unlike the concept of duty that is a regard for an end, freedom is a concept that allows man to “think of the causality of his own will” that is separate from the world of sense (p.70). Ultimately the concept of freedom is inseparable from the notion of autonomy that is requisite of the universal laws of morality. Kant explains this principle when he claims that “if we think of ourselves as free, we transport ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality; whereas if we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging both to the world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible world (p.70). This foundation in the concept of freedom speaks more of how reason operates within the intelligible world and makes clear its relation to the sensual. It might not be entirely clear how such a finding about the mind could be verified but the existence of the intelligible is not a question that could be accounted empirically according to Kant. The concept of freedom tries to show exactly how the intelligible contributes to our judgments that have moral consequences within the world.
It might be useful at this point to also consider what Kant calls the categorical imperative as an example of the relationship between freedom and morality in the world. Kant notes that there are two types of imperatives. The first is the hypothetical imperative that says that an action is warranted by its intended purpose actual or possible. The categorical imperative declares an action necessary without reference to its observable end (p.31). Out of the two the categorical imperative conforms more closely to Kant’s definition of the concept of freedom that is itself necessary foundation of a rational being, though questions like how and to what extent the concept of freedom is implied by a rational capacity is an assumption that is a faith in rationality. Moreover, the categorical imperative is unconditional in its end as Kant explains when he makes the following comparison: “if I think of a hypothetical imperatives as such, I do not know what it will contain until the condition is stated {under which it is an imperative]. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it will contain.” (p.37) In terms of its moral application, Kant argues that there is only one, though he makes mention of three, categorical imperative. The first is “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (p.38). As was discussed earlier, the morality is based in universality, i.e. the good, but what makes Kant’s imperative compelling is that it is both a duty towards an end while remaining open to the means that might bring that about. He describes a “maxim” as a subjective judgment that considers the conditions of the agent and differs significantly from an objective law. As it is based in this reasoned account of the conditions, the categorical imperatives demonstrates how the means can be already implied in the end that is sought. The second categorical imperative mentioned is “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p.46). For the moral agent this imperative places a strong emphasis on recognizing the capacity of every rational being. Unlike objects within the world, freedom is an intelligible concept that regards the thing in itself. This is a principle for all rational beings that not only transpose themselves from their own sensual body but could also do the same in their regard for others. In this way, regarding each as an end rather than a means is a moral principle that remains open. The final categorical imperative is to respect the Idea that “the will of every rational being as making universal law” (p.48). By regarding our own freedom and its capacity to impart itself upon the sensual, the concept of freedom is both useful in the sense that it informs our actions but it also must remain incalculable in order the end of the good in all its possible forms. Throughout all of these expressions of the categorical imperative there is a common theme in its acceptance of the ends rather than the means is a principle of freedom is a necessity of every rational being.

Criticism

Nearing the end of the text, I found the concept of the "realm of ends" to be the least persuasive point. It appeared simply to restate the argument made about the rational agent legislating its own law but only extending further to a utopian ideal of the good. While the categorical imperative retains, or does not injure, the practical aspects of its effect, I feel that the realm of ends is perhaps based in the pure good but would call for a purely intelligible world. In this section, Kant failed to explore what could happen when the laws of others conflict with our own but also how the existence of others provides the foundation for any moral exchange to occur. Though there is an apparent gap in this section, it has become clear that many of his comments centered on the experience of a rational being and not its relational context (though the categorical imperative is based in some extent on keeping that aspect of experience open). While there is an emphasis to think of the other as an end, it could easily be a figment of the imagination as there is no requirement for the other to actually exist in relation to a good will. In considering what we will as universal law, does Kant intend us to ask and live as through our maxim were law, or is this effort already taken up within reason itself?

Conclusion
The completeness of Kant’s theory is not so much the greatest concern, for he admits the limitations of knowing the intelligible order that our moral judgment emerge from. Rather it is in what he calls the “duty” to regard other rational beings that makes Kant’s categorical imperative a possible moral basis. For when we rely on particulars examples or consensus to inform the principles of moral agency, it is at that moment that morality ceases to be a possibility for the other whom we have yet to regard. Kant’s intelligible perspective shows that our capacity to transpose ourselves into the experience of the other is the condition which makes morality a possibility.