Today's seminar was a discussion of Herbert Marcuse's opus work One-Dimensional Man. The covers a range of subjects but what it remains consistent in is its critic of what he calls "technological progress" which is present in all modern societies no matter what their political ideologies may consist of. In this telling narrative of the rise from feudal order, technology has been a way of man to relieve the suffering that is caused his subjugation to nature. Moreover, this has been a causal force of political organization and as such has led to an unbiased view of technology in a purely positivistic sense. What we deem as progress is a singularity of achieving technological means, for without this principle control over nature political organization would have remained as a localized feudal order (for without the mass production, transportation, and communication that depend on technology the modern society would cease to exist). Although technology provides a particular material means, this does not at all represent what lies at the origin of technological thinking.
Language plays a significant role in the way that we come to understand and orient ourselves within the world. Many early moderns had regarded language as contingent on a particular set of historical circumstances - alterable at any particular at any point without any said reason other than to serve a particular end. The classical conception of language is considered a reflection of archetypes, a reaching back into the past where origin reflected real world principles. These two conceptions of language show the contrast between classical and technical understanding. The former is based in essentialist principles and the other is an instrumental principles. With respect to how these two world views differ, the classical considers itself to be preformed while the other does not possess any particular substance.
What then does this mean about language and its orientation to the present? An instrumental use poses a significant risk against the non-practical use of language. But in posing this as a potential threat, I've become acutely aware that my proposition has little consequence within a technological context. The contradiction, which warrants this hasty dismissal, is that it lacks productive capacity. Indeed, we are subsumed within a culture of productive means but we must be careful to identify that it is the instrumental mode of production that is dominant.
To demonstrate the way technological language has been deployed, Marcuse points to the use of acronyms. On the one hand, acronyms are a fast an efficient way to relay information but they are also a means of exclusion that does not attempt to build understanding but to narrow discourse to a singular voice. Professor Koivukoski mentioned his own grudge with the technical language common in administration meetings and media. The term "moving forward" is often used to progress the conversation from a silence or disagreement. There is no specific direction the conversation, it is just simply an efficient phrase used to push forward another point. Another word "actually" is often used to suggest to the listener that what is to follow is not tentative but has a real consequence within the world. This emphasis on what is forms a particular movement within technological language to suggest solutions that then pacify the contingencies or signs of a present disagreement.
Technologies relation to nature is based in domination over the material obstacles of nature that afflict humanity. But technology can be applied to human nature and as such a means of control language has effectively taken the place of physical subversion. Control in this sense is not based on a silencing of nature, but rather a limiting of nature. When one thinks of a agriculture, technology is used to cut down a forest, till the land, and leave in its place the nature of our choosing. So too does technological language dilute the tensions and differences that are obstacles to a completely singular unity.
Monday, October 27, 2008
Sunday, October 19, 2008
Aesthetics as embodyment
My essay proposal will focus on aesthetics and how it has been used in the 20th century to describe the embodyment of the subject. A majority of the discussions in class have been centered around a view of a transcendental subject, but this does not take into account the aspects of being that follow from a subject's embodied subjectivity. Until the 20th century, the philosophic tradition was almost entirely subject centered. Much of the emphasis that has been placed on autonomy or the active consciousness have debased the subject in a way that excludes all passivity, in particular the role of being possed by a body, that may very well be the precondition for any form of consciousnss. Aesthetics in particular is an interesting middle ground between pure subject and object for neither can truely be said to offer the complete meaning of art on its own. What aesethics suggests about the experience of embodiment is not so much what art/artist are, but rather aesethics makes room for 'how' of being that emerges from a body.
Early aesthetic theory regarded art as an extention of our sensual preferences understood through universal concepts like beauty or sublimity. Reason from this standpoint played a central role in the interpretation of art and what was fit to call an aesthetic experience. Emmanual Kant's turn on this practacl interpretation of aesthetics appeared in "Critque of Pure Judgement" and has been regarded as one of his most influential contributions. Kant's interest in the divisions of the mind brought him to question what were the conditions needed for judgment to take place. Using the aesthetic experience as an example, he attempted to find a source of judgment that was common to all rational beings. He argued that aesthetic judgment did not rely on the use of reason, it came out of a deficiency within the faculty of reason that overwhelmed its ability to function. It is in this respect that an interest with merely describing beauty and sublimity as understood sensually were replaced by a concern for the rational subject as a unique potential of will.
Criticism from 20th century movements like Surrealism and Dadaism posed the question of whether the merit of art as a category served other purposes than signalling any clear distinction about what art represented. Instead of regarding the interpretation of art externally as object or concept, there was suddenly a greater emphasis on the content of art as its meaning. Are our everyday experiences in the world significantly different from art, and if not what then does art represent? This question occupies many of the observations about art presented in Martin Heidegger Origins of the Work of Art. Heidegger attempts to establish an understanding of art that is not based on its reference to its substance or conceptual agreement but rather a view of artwork that "opens up in its own way the Being of beings" (p.165). Art, for Heidegger, granted access to this realm of being-in-the-world that was not reducible to any being but offered a description of a truely common condition. Alternatively, other 20th century thinkers turned away from a phenomenological description to render a practacle concern for art, its content and distritbution, along dialectical or historical materialist terms. Both Albert Marcuso and Walter Benjamin represent this view of a transcendental subject that is not based in reason but conditioned by the tension within a given historical context. Through an experience of aura or sublimation, the voice of the individual subject emerges but only by virtue of its repression.
While the phenomenology and critical theory may differ in their point of reference, both attempt to regard art in a way that counters the assumptions of an autonomous subject. Although there has been some contention concerning the end of art in itself, art nonetheless represents a unique possibility where a true respect for being can be formed.
Early aesthetic theory regarded art as an extention of our sensual preferences understood through universal concepts like beauty or sublimity. Reason from this standpoint played a central role in the interpretation of art and what was fit to call an aesthetic experience. Emmanual Kant's turn on this practacl interpretation of aesthetics appeared in "Critque of Pure Judgement" and has been regarded as one of his most influential contributions. Kant's interest in the divisions of the mind brought him to question what were the conditions needed for judgment to take place. Using the aesthetic experience as an example, he attempted to find a source of judgment that was common to all rational beings. He argued that aesthetic judgment did not rely on the use of reason, it came out of a deficiency within the faculty of reason that overwhelmed its ability to function. It is in this respect that an interest with merely describing beauty and sublimity as understood sensually were replaced by a concern for the rational subject as a unique potential of will.
Criticism from 20th century movements like Surrealism and Dadaism posed the question of whether the merit of art as a category served other purposes than signalling any clear distinction about what art represented. Instead of regarding the interpretation of art externally as object or concept, there was suddenly a greater emphasis on the content of art as its meaning. Are our everyday experiences in the world significantly different from art, and if not what then does art represent? This question occupies many of the observations about art presented in Martin Heidegger Origins of the Work of Art. Heidegger attempts to establish an understanding of art that is not based on its reference to its substance or conceptual agreement but rather a view of artwork that "opens up in its own way the Being of beings" (p.165). Art, for Heidegger, granted access to this realm of being-in-the-world that was not reducible to any being but offered a description of a truely common condition. Alternatively, other 20th century thinkers turned away from a phenomenological description to render a practacle concern for art, its content and distritbution, along dialectical or historical materialist terms. Both Albert Marcuso and Walter Benjamin represent this view of a transcendental subject that is not based in reason but conditioned by the tension within a given historical context. Through an experience of aura or sublimation, the voice of the individual subject emerges but only by virtue of its repression.
While the phenomenology and critical theory may differ in their point of reference, both attempt to regard art in a way that counters the assumptions of an autonomous subject. Although there has been some contention concerning the end of art in itself, art nonetheless represents a unique possibility where a true respect for being can be formed.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Phenomenology of Race
There are some among us in the recent months leading up to the presedential election in the united states who have wondered about the role that the appearence of senator obama in mass media will have on the consciousness of race in america. His famous speech during the primaries before June's democratic convention had for a moment captured the attention of everyone in america - have we really admitted our tolerance and familiarity with the divisions of race?
There has also been a sense that philosophy has left behind the practacle world, a reference to the issues we face in the everyday life. Typically within phenomenology, philosophers have gone the root of describing only essence but rarely do we accept the diversions into biased opinions. But these are in certain respects very revealing on their own and speak to the over arching structures that support the production of these concepts. Gadamer, although not speaking about race relationship, had often spoke about the way that our prejudices are formed through a historical process. He called for scholars to change their attitude towards prejudice as misleading or errornious, a "prejudice against prejudice" that has been inherited from the enlightenment fixation on continuity, we should instead try to keep ourselves open and regard heurminutically the way these concepts come to be transmited and formulated within a historical context.
A phenomenology of race would require an approach that would not concern itself strickly with the physical aspects of race nor the knowledge of race, rather a phenomenological understanding of race would be more in line with the feeling of embodiment, a feeling or attunement to self from within and in relation to the body. What are the limiting conditions of that perspective? What other ways does the experience of embodyment serve to reaffirm this tension within a rational being? Neither of these questions can be fully decided upon for we are dealing with the subjectivity of a variety of independant experiences. Should we seek to reduce the focus of independent experiences to some primordial or aporitic foundational? That is an even more baseless question which then goes to complicate further what we already have the impression resists clear expression. How many number of decisions made throughout the course of every day are done with a preknowledge of race?
Perhaps what I am trying to evoke here is more along something that Heidegger would have meant by calling language the "house of being". Language always implies its preexisting origin, not a teleologically fixed or mystical origin, but one that reproduces itself within the historical context it emerges - a genative origin. What type of origin can that be? Is this a self-obsessed nihilist forging the world with the stroke of an existential brush? Or does one need to surrender to the impossibility of a true Origin in order to make being accessible? All these are good criticism and show the faith in the prejudged position (scholars should always conduct research in a sympathetic mode that acknowledges all ideas as having merit). As a genative origin I mean simply the act of creating or perhaps one might understand it as a changing the shape of what was there. As opposed to any definitive Origin, one more mystical in function, is itself only a possibility among infinite possibilities. There is no hierarchial value attributed to the concept of a genative origin but what it does propose is something much more startling. The confirmation of the relational character of production! It simpler terms, the genative origin is one that describes what it is comes forth at every moment, not strickly reserved to physical or even language based relations, through the sometimes intangible and emotive subtleties of being. A phenomenology of race would not take for grantide the way in which this web of relations bleed into each other, where the embodiment of being is the site of real investigation in how relations are not at any time formed by one type of exchange.
There has also been a sense that philosophy has left behind the practacle world, a reference to the issues we face in the everyday life. Typically within phenomenology, philosophers have gone the root of describing only essence but rarely do we accept the diversions into biased opinions. But these are in certain respects very revealing on their own and speak to the over arching structures that support the production of these concepts. Gadamer, although not speaking about race relationship, had often spoke about the way that our prejudices are formed through a historical process. He called for scholars to change their attitude towards prejudice as misleading or errornious, a "prejudice against prejudice" that has been inherited from the enlightenment fixation on continuity, we should instead try to keep ourselves open and regard heurminutically the way these concepts come to be transmited and formulated within a historical context.
A phenomenology of race would require an approach that would not concern itself strickly with the physical aspects of race nor the knowledge of race, rather a phenomenological understanding of race would be more in line with the feeling of embodiment, a feeling or attunement to self from within and in relation to the body. What are the limiting conditions of that perspective? What other ways does the experience of embodyment serve to reaffirm this tension within a rational being? Neither of these questions can be fully decided upon for we are dealing with the subjectivity of a variety of independant experiences. Should we seek to reduce the focus of independent experiences to some primordial or aporitic foundational? That is an even more baseless question which then goes to complicate further what we already have the impression resists clear expression. How many number of decisions made throughout the course of every day are done with a preknowledge of race?
Perhaps what I am trying to evoke here is more along something that Heidegger would have meant by calling language the "house of being". Language always implies its preexisting origin, not a teleologically fixed or mystical origin, but one that reproduces itself within the historical context it emerges - a genative origin. What type of origin can that be? Is this a self-obsessed nihilist forging the world with the stroke of an existential brush? Or does one need to surrender to the impossibility of a true Origin in order to make being accessible? All these are good criticism and show the faith in the prejudged position (scholars should always conduct research in a sympathetic mode that acknowledges all ideas as having merit). As a genative origin I mean simply the act of creating or perhaps one might understand it as a changing the shape of what was there. As opposed to any definitive Origin, one more mystical in function, is itself only a possibility among infinite possibilities. There is no hierarchial value attributed to the concept of a genative origin but what it does propose is something much more startling. The confirmation of the relational character of production! It simpler terms, the genative origin is one that describes what it is comes forth at every moment, not strickly reserved to physical or even language based relations, through the sometimes intangible and emotive subtleties of being. A phenomenology of race would not take for grantide the way in which this web of relations bleed into each other, where the embodiment of being is the site of real investigation in how relations are not at any time formed by one type of exchange.
Thursday, October 9, 2008
Inverted
What would happen if one were to experience a constant inversion of their former perspectives? To relive the moment of emancipation with each step taken. There are two possibilities, either one would be consumed by a perpetual state of satisfaction, to be encountered existentially within each moment with an almost definite but uncertain prediction of the future, or an overturning that would gradually cease to be enough to satisfy and one's appetites and eventually become dull like a cutting blade.
All of our presuppositions are windows to a particular view of reality that limits but also opens up to the question of Being. For within each world perspective, whether from the academic, the insect, or the tiger there is a tapestry of worlds painted up each individual being.
Today, I want to talk about what it would mean to invert such a world view. This question has its own presupposition, that there does exist a being who can invert such a view - for nothing can invert a perspective unintentionally and therefore must be fully conscious.
Could this inversion operate unintentionally? It is little faith in claiming all intentionality the sole possession of consciousness. There are, as I am prepared to defend, reasonable grounds to believe that activity occurs without intentionality. The mere presence of an object in one place can at any moment collide with another. There is no given intention, no initial spark from an omnipotent being. The everyday is filled with countless unintentional events that are not by themselves conditional but come into contact without the precondition of form or presence.
So do inversions then take place on their own, without our desiring them and do they tell us something fundamentally essential about our nature? To deconstruct this concept, it would appear that neither possibility accounts for non-being which is a definite possibility. So why worry about it? Why should we feel heart broken by the perspective of a vegetable?
Today I violated a vegetable. It was there, placed in amongst the ordinary objects like a screen door and concrete driveway. What an uncommon place for life. And there I saw the opportunity present itself - polluted bong water required a safe dumping spot and so there among other forgotten things I emptied the cylinder. What became clear to me afterwards is that not only had I chosen this site specifically to rid myself of an inconvenience, but I had done so with the intention to cause harm. But from an outside perspective, one based heavily on traditional vexations of ethics, I would have done nothing unethical. Perhaps to environmentalist my offence would have been obvious but to those insensitive to environment matters my actions would have been seen as consistent with the status quo. That I feel requires some deep thought to dive into, a concept that is most alarming and painfully irresolvable. Should we even think towards reconciliation? To retain being in its substance? Perhaps existence is not everything.
All of our presuppositions are windows to a particular view of reality that limits but also opens up to the question of Being. For within each world perspective, whether from the academic, the insect, or the tiger there is a tapestry of worlds painted up each individual being.
Today, I want to talk about what it would mean to invert such a world view. This question has its own presupposition, that there does exist a being who can invert such a view - for nothing can invert a perspective unintentionally and therefore must be fully conscious.
Could this inversion operate unintentionally? It is little faith in claiming all intentionality the sole possession of consciousness. There are, as I am prepared to defend, reasonable grounds to believe that activity occurs without intentionality. The mere presence of an object in one place can at any moment collide with another. There is no given intention, no initial spark from an omnipotent being. The everyday is filled with countless unintentional events that are not by themselves conditional but come into contact without the precondition of form or presence.
So do inversions then take place on their own, without our desiring them and do they tell us something fundamentally essential about our nature? To deconstruct this concept, it would appear that neither possibility accounts for non-being which is a definite possibility. So why worry about it? Why should we feel heart broken by the perspective of a vegetable?
Today I violated a vegetable. It was there, placed in amongst the ordinary objects like a screen door and concrete driveway. What an uncommon place for life. And there I saw the opportunity present itself - polluted bong water required a safe dumping spot and so there among other forgotten things I emptied the cylinder. What became clear to me afterwards is that not only had I chosen this site specifically to rid myself of an inconvenience, but I had done so with the intention to cause harm. But from an outside perspective, one based heavily on traditional vexations of ethics, I would have done nothing unethical. Perhaps to environmentalist my offence would have been obvious but to those insensitive to environment matters my actions would have been seen as consistent with the status quo. That I feel requires some deep thought to dive into, a concept that is most alarming and painfully irresolvable. Should we even think towards reconciliation? To retain being in its substance? Perhaps existence is not everything.
PHIL4205 - Heidegger - Method and Form
During today's lecture on Heidegger The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics I often found myself returning to how his curiosity returned to the place of the universal. I had mentioned the paralell between enlightenment positivism and Heideggers use of the term "positive research" to professor Jowette who only dismissed my comment as misunderstanding what Heidegger intended to say about the possibility of find true knowledge. Although I respect this oppinion and have no doubt about questioning Heidegger good intent, I am somewhat less able to conceed that his reasearch did not at all share something with his enlightenment predecessors. One might argue that my inclination to this interpretation is a gross misunderstanding of Heideggerian thought, after all this is the scholar who had devoted a great deal of work to challenging conventional understanding - particularly the ideas of modernity. Nonetheless, could we not equate Heidegger rejection of modernity as also a projection into a different ideal set of circumstances? A point when the academic bantering over an identification of "subject" from an exclusively ontic perspective. Though I am unable to point directly to Heideggers intended meaning, it does not seem fitting that I also release my suspicion on account of his eloquent criticism of the positions he puts forward. A number of critics have raised similar arguements, that it is sensless to ask the question of Being because it is so inaccessible. But I would not subscribe to this view either - Heidegger is too pursuasive on this front as he makes clear some of the real ways in which the concern for Being can be observed, even if only in small and subtle ways. Heidegger's preoccupation with the question of Being, the same that had once fascinated the early greeks, therefore represents a significant direction in his work but what does it mean to pose the question of Being?. To draw from Heidegger himself, to ask the methodology of what one considers is to be possessed by a preoccupation of what that thing is. By defining the Being as something common to all beings, and yet at the same time overlooked by them, shows a particular disdain for the structures in which we can now find our present subject. The study is, as Heidegger regards it, an investigation of "essences" from which the subject is fundementally contained within. His use of the term "positive research" is not to be overlooked too easily, for it is when we affirm the true essence of the thing we are actually considering the thing in itself. This however is not to be confused with the enlightenment pursuit of the perfectability of man, but it is not fundementally not seperate from it either. In both cases, it is reasearch that yeilds the very truths from which we obtain a sense of the thing irrelivent of whether certain truths are more true than others. Though I have a great regard for Heidegger's work whose influence continues to humble my thinking, I am not yet will to conceed that he is wholely opposed to his own orientation to a future conclusion that follows the collaps of conventional knowledge, as is suggested by his use of the term Dasein to collaps all worldlyness of being(s).
Monday, October 6, 2008
Emmanuel Kant: Ethical Apriori
Method - Introduction
Emanuel Kant's The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals attempts to establish a basis for ethics that comes from an apriori description, a form of analysis referred to as “Pure” philosophy. Kant's interest in approaching ethics through this descriptive method comes from his dissatisfaction with the many ethical views that claim universal agreement yet remain fixed on a particular means (i.e. Christian’s sanctification or the utilitarian’s calculus). What made these approaches unsuitable for Kant is that they did not speak of an essentially good ethic removed from the contingency of desire or external objective; in other words for a long time ethics failed to consider the more general condition of the rational being and their capacity to make moral judgments. This is not to suggest that Kant thought such a rational ethic could replace other moral views. Instead Kant wished to orient the question away from "what is morality?" to ask instead "how can we be moral?" Supposing that is such a principle of ethics based on the level of judgment, the shortfalls of making inferences based on examples of actions, convention, or inclination requires that we exclude these factors in order to reach a more essential feature of judgment. For this reason, Kant's focus on an apriori foundation is not to suggest that ethics exist independently from what can be known empirically or acted upon practically, rather his investigation is to determine the necessary conditions needed for any rational being to be moral.
I've identified three major points addressed within The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant uses to support the claim that there is an apriori foundation of morality for the rational being.
1) Existence of the Good Will
2) Respect of Law through Duty
3) Freedom as incalculable
All of the above points mentioned function to both describe the conditions of moral judgment and how it arises from self-autonomy. The apriori portion is based in our capacity to legislate moral law which shall be discussed in further depth as we continue.
Good Will
Kant states in The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that "Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL.” (p.9). If we were to focus on our basic notions of ethics as an obligation to do good onto others or ourselves, in all of the conventions of ethics the good is a universal principle that is a factor in every end. As for the will, we would be better to regard it as the means of bring about good in the world. Ethics happens when the both of these factors are present. This is not to say that there is no separation to be drawn between the “good” and the “will” for they are both towards the same end.
There are two reasons for Kant’s view of ethics to be fundamentally based in this good will that is beyond qualification. Firstly, a good that is without qualification is an essence and must always come before any particular result. Kant goes on to state that "the good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because of its willing i.e., it is good in itself" (p.10). It is because of this concern for the “good in itself” that we recognize what Kant means when he says that we are to will what is against what we would otherwise do or against social convention. To truly become aware of the will, one needs to exclude all possible inclinations that could interfere with a rendering of the end that is the good will.
Secondly, that which is called the "good in itself" entails that it is not only essential but also autonomous. Kant regards autonomy as the ability to legislate for oneself. The good will is autonomous because it is of the good that is essential in every end and can never be subject to any means or intended outcome. Though the good can be brought about in variety of different ways, if we are to understand ethics as regard for the good it must be oriented to one point of reference.
Duty and Law
Kant’s interest in establishing apriori foundations does not remove itself entirely from a consideration of the means that make ethics possible. In particular, the faculty of reason plays an important role as the means in Kant’s ethical philosophy. To demonstrate the role of reason, Kant points to a concept such as duty to explain how reason correspondence to the good. For example, Kant mentions the duty of a merchant to treat customers fairly and sell product at an equal price. The customer is served by the honesty of the merchant and it is also to the merchant’s advantage to behave in a professional manner. But this is not in accordance with one’s duty to the good for there are many other incentives for him to behave in such a way. Kant contrasts this example with one that demonstrates an action done for the sake of duty. For example, individuals who suffer under the adversities and hopelessness may come to the conclusion that to relieve their suffering would be best served by ending their life. But instead, if in spite of the desire for death they preserve their life they have conformed to duty that is against their own self-interest thus their actions have moral merit.
Although these examples are quite limited in their application, what is a consistent theme is that they demonstrate a relation and non-relation to a good end. As was the case with the examples above, Kant’s interest in determining how actions can have moral worth bring him to offer three propositions used to assess whether an action is in accordance with the good. The first is that an action must be done from duty. The first example of the merchant demonstrates this principle well because it is not made clear whether honesty had been offered out of duty or if there were other factors that could explain the decision to be honest. Secondly, the moral worth of an action of duty is not in the purpose to be achieved but the maxim it is determined by. The second example of the individual duty to the preservation of life comes out of a maxim that is opposed to their self-interest to end suffering. In fact, we might even say as a principle of acting in accordance with the good will one ought to do what they would not otherwise wish to do for themselves. And thirdly, “duty is the necessity to do an action from respect for law” (p.16). While the first two propositions were conditions of the good will that have already been addressed, in emphasizing duty as “respect” for law Kant is trying to identify how the moral subject is effected by the law. It should first be pointed out that law is for Kant as objective as nature itself. Law cannot contradict itself and does not offer any manner of choice. Kant states that “we are always subject to law, [thus] respect can be regarded as the effect of law on the subject and not as the cause of law” (p.17). In describing law as a condition of nature, law is a constraint placed upon the will and acted upon as duty in the good. Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws i.e. according to principles proscribe by nature. Because nature provides us with an objective point of reference which our ethical decisions are based upon, it is ultimately up to the rational being to act in accordance with law. A being that is not possessed with a rational capacity cannot be ethical for it always implies that there is a regard for law. Not every rational being will be able to account for every variable of law but it is the maxim that is willed that is ethically significant.
Freedom
Kant’s understanding of the foundation of ethical judgment comes from an ability of the rational being to consider the concept of freedom employed by reason. According to Kant, the subject exists in a division between an intelligible world where its actions are equated with causality and a sensual world where it is belonging to the world. Because this intelligible world view regards also the sensual and thus what is in accordance to the laws of nature, Kant regards the laws of the intelligible as “imperatives” for the subject that are foundational in determining its will (p.71). Imperatives are described as commandments of reason that constrain the will. The imperative, unlike the laws of nature, ask one to consider what one “ought” to do but it is not a law that binds the unconditional will within its subjective constitution (p.29). Unlike the concept of duty that is a regard for an end, freedom is a concept that allows man to “think of the causality of his own will” that is separate from the world of sense (p.70). Ultimately the concept of freedom is inseparable from the notion of autonomy that is requisite of the universal laws of morality. Kant explains this principle when he claims that “if we think of ourselves as free, we transport ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality; whereas if we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging both to the world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible world (p.70). This foundation in the concept of freedom speaks more of how reason operates within the intelligible world and makes clear its relation to the sensual. It might not be entirely clear how such a finding about the mind could be verified but the existence of the intelligible is not a question that could be accounted empirically according to Kant. The concept of freedom tries to show exactly how the intelligible contributes to our judgments that have moral consequences within the world.
It might be useful at this point to also consider what Kant calls the categorical imperative as an example of the relationship between freedom and morality in the world. Kant notes that there are two types of imperatives. The first is the hypothetical imperative that says that an action is warranted by its intended purpose actual or possible. The categorical imperative declares an action necessary without reference to its observable end (p.31). Out of the two the categorical imperative conforms more closely to Kant’s definition of the concept of freedom that is itself necessary foundation of a rational being, though questions like how and to what extent the concept of freedom is implied by a rational capacity is an assumption that is a faith in rationality. Moreover, the categorical imperative is unconditional in its end as Kant explains when he makes the following comparison: “if I think of a hypothetical imperatives as such, I do not know what it will contain until the condition is stated {under which it is an imperative]. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it will contain.” (p.37) In terms of its moral application, Kant argues that there is only one, though he makes mention of three, categorical imperative. The first is “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (p.38). As was discussed earlier, the morality is based in universality, i.e. the good, but what makes Kant’s imperative compelling is that it is both a duty towards an end while remaining open to the means that might bring that about. He describes a “maxim” as a subjective judgment that considers the conditions of the agent and differs significantly from an objective law. As it is based in this reasoned account of the conditions, the categorical imperatives demonstrates how the means can be already implied in the end that is sought. The second categorical imperative mentioned is “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p.46). For the moral agent this imperative places a strong emphasis on recognizing the capacity of every rational being. Unlike objects within the world, freedom is an intelligible concept that regards the thing in itself. This is a principle for all rational beings that not only transpose themselves from their own sensual body but could also do the same in their regard for others. In this way, regarding each as an end rather than a means is a moral principle that remains open. The final categorical imperative is to respect the Idea that “the will of every rational being as making universal law” (p.48). By regarding our own freedom and its capacity to impart itself upon the sensual, the concept of freedom is both useful in the sense that it informs our actions but it also must remain incalculable in order the end of the good in all its possible forms. Throughout all of these expressions of the categorical imperative there is a common theme in its acceptance of the ends rather than the means is a principle of freedom is a necessity of every rational being.
Criticism
Nearing the end of the text, I found the concept of the "realm of ends" to be the least persuasive point. It appeared simply to restate the argument made about the rational agent legislating its own law but only extending further to a utopian ideal of the good. While the categorical imperative retains, or does not injure, the practical aspects of its effect, I feel that the realm of ends is perhaps based in the pure good but would call for a purely intelligible world. In this section, Kant failed to explore what could happen when the laws of others conflict with our own but also how the existence of others provides the foundation for any moral exchange to occur. Though there is an apparent gap in this section, it has become clear that many of his comments centered on the experience of a rational being and not its relational context (though the categorical imperative is based in some extent on keeping that aspect of experience open). While there is an emphasis to think of the other as an end, it could easily be a figment of the imagination as there is no requirement for the other to actually exist in relation to a good will. In considering what we will as universal law, does Kant intend us to ask and live as through our maxim were law, or is this effort already taken up within reason itself?
Conclusion
The completeness of Kant’s theory is not so much the greatest concern, for he admits the limitations of knowing the intelligible order that our moral judgment emerge from. Rather it is in what he calls the “duty” to regard other rational beings that makes Kant’s categorical imperative a possible moral basis. For when we rely on particulars examples or consensus to inform the principles of moral agency, it is at that moment that morality ceases to be a possibility for the other whom we have yet to regard. Kant’s intelligible perspective shows that our capacity to transpose ourselves into the experience of the other is the condition which makes morality a possibility.
Emanuel Kant's The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals attempts to establish a basis for ethics that comes from an apriori description, a form of analysis referred to as “Pure” philosophy. Kant's interest in approaching ethics through this descriptive method comes from his dissatisfaction with the many ethical views that claim universal agreement yet remain fixed on a particular means (i.e. Christian’s sanctification or the utilitarian’s calculus). What made these approaches unsuitable for Kant is that they did not speak of an essentially good ethic removed from the contingency of desire or external objective; in other words for a long time ethics failed to consider the more general condition of the rational being and their capacity to make moral judgments. This is not to suggest that Kant thought such a rational ethic could replace other moral views. Instead Kant wished to orient the question away from "what is morality?" to ask instead "how can we be moral?" Supposing that is such a principle of ethics based on the level of judgment, the shortfalls of making inferences based on examples of actions, convention, or inclination requires that we exclude these factors in order to reach a more essential feature of judgment. For this reason, Kant's focus on an apriori foundation is not to suggest that ethics exist independently from what can be known empirically or acted upon practically, rather his investigation is to determine the necessary conditions needed for any rational being to be moral.
I've identified three major points addressed within The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant uses to support the claim that there is an apriori foundation of morality for the rational being.
1) Existence of the Good Will
2) Respect of Law through Duty
3) Freedom as incalculable
All of the above points mentioned function to both describe the conditions of moral judgment and how it arises from self-autonomy. The apriori portion is based in our capacity to legislate moral law which shall be discussed in further depth as we continue.
Good Will
Kant states in The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals that "Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL.” (p.9). If we were to focus on our basic notions of ethics as an obligation to do good onto others or ourselves, in all of the conventions of ethics the good is a universal principle that is a factor in every end. As for the will, we would be better to regard it as the means of bring about good in the world. Ethics happens when the both of these factors are present. This is not to say that there is no separation to be drawn between the “good” and the “will” for they are both towards the same end.
There are two reasons for Kant’s view of ethics to be fundamentally based in this good will that is beyond qualification. Firstly, a good that is without qualification is an essence and must always come before any particular result. Kant goes on to state that "the good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence to achieve some intended end; it is good only because of its willing i.e., it is good in itself" (p.10). It is because of this concern for the “good in itself” that we recognize what Kant means when he says that we are to will what is against what we would otherwise do or against social convention. To truly become aware of the will, one needs to exclude all possible inclinations that could interfere with a rendering of the end that is the good will.
Secondly, that which is called the "good in itself" entails that it is not only essential but also autonomous. Kant regards autonomy as the ability to legislate for oneself. The good will is autonomous because it is of the good that is essential in every end and can never be subject to any means or intended outcome. Though the good can be brought about in variety of different ways, if we are to understand ethics as regard for the good it must be oriented to one point of reference.
Duty and Law
Kant’s interest in establishing apriori foundations does not remove itself entirely from a consideration of the means that make ethics possible. In particular, the faculty of reason plays an important role as the means in Kant’s ethical philosophy. To demonstrate the role of reason, Kant points to a concept such as duty to explain how reason correspondence to the good. For example, Kant mentions the duty of a merchant to treat customers fairly and sell product at an equal price. The customer is served by the honesty of the merchant and it is also to the merchant’s advantage to behave in a professional manner. But this is not in accordance with one’s duty to the good for there are many other incentives for him to behave in such a way. Kant contrasts this example with one that demonstrates an action done for the sake of duty. For example, individuals who suffer under the adversities and hopelessness may come to the conclusion that to relieve their suffering would be best served by ending their life. But instead, if in spite of the desire for death they preserve their life they have conformed to duty that is against their own self-interest thus their actions have moral merit.
Although these examples are quite limited in their application, what is a consistent theme is that they demonstrate a relation and non-relation to a good end. As was the case with the examples above, Kant’s interest in determining how actions can have moral worth bring him to offer three propositions used to assess whether an action is in accordance with the good. The first is that an action must be done from duty. The first example of the merchant demonstrates this principle well because it is not made clear whether honesty had been offered out of duty or if there were other factors that could explain the decision to be honest. Secondly, the moral worth of an action of duty is not in the purpose to be achieved but the maxim it is determined by. The second example of the individual duty to the preservation of life comes out of a maxim that is opposed to their self-interest to end suffering. In fact, we might even say as a principle of acting in accordance with the good will one ought to do what they would not otherwise wish to do for themselves. And thirdly, “duty is the necessity to do an action from respect for law” (p.16). While the first two propositions were conditions of the good will that have already been addressed, in emphasizing duty as “respect” for law Kant is trying to identify how the moral subject is effected by the law. It should first be pointed out that law is for Kant as objective as nature itself. Law cannot contradict itself and does not offer any manner of choice. Kant states that “we are always subject to law, [thus] respect can be regarded as the effect of law on the subject and not as the cause of law” (p.17). In describing law as a condition of nature, law is a constraint placed upon the will and acted upon as duty in the good. Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws i.e. according to principles proscribe by nature. Because nature provides us with an objective point of reference which our ethical decisions are based upon, it is ultimately up to the rational being to act in accordance with law. A being that is not possessed with a rational capacity cannot be ethical for it always implies that there is a regard for law. Not every rational being will be able to account for every variable of law but it is the maxim that is willed that is ethically significant.
Freedom
Kant’s understanding of the foundation of ethical judgment comes from an ability of the rational being to consider the concept of freedom employed by reason. According to Kant, the subject exists in a division between an intelligible world where its actions are equated with causality and a sensual world where it is belonging to the world. Because this intelligible world view regards also the sensual and thus what is in accordance to the laws of nature, Kant regards the laws of the intelligible as “imperatives” for the subject that are foundational in determining its will (p.71). Imperatives are described as commandments of reason that constrain the will. The imperative, unlike the laws of nature, ask one to consider what one “ought” to do but it is not a law that binds the unconditional will within its subjective constitution (p.29). Unlike the concept of duty that is a regard for an end, freedom is a concept that allows man to “think of the causality of his own will” that is separate from the world of sense (p.70). Ultimately the concept of freedom is inseparable from the notion of autonomy that is requisite of the universal laws of morality. Kant explains this principle when he claims that “if we think of ourselves as free, we transport ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality; whereas if we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging both to the world of sense and at the same time to the intelligible world (p.70). This foundation in the concept of freedom speaks more of how reason operates within the intelligible world and makes clear its relation to the sensual. It might not be entirely clear how such a finding about the mind could be verified but the existence of the intelligible is not a question that could be accounted empirically according to Kant. The concept of freedom tries to show exactly how the intelligible contributes to our judgments that have moral consequences within the world.
It might be useful at this point to also consider what Kant calls the categorical imperative as an example of the relationship between freedom and morality in the world. Kant notes that there are two types of imperatives. The first is the hypothetical imperative that says that an action is warranted by its intended purpose actual or possible. The categorical imperative declares an action necessary without reference to its observable end (p.31). Out of the two the categorical imperative conforms more closely to Kant’s definition of the concept of freedom that is itself necessary foundation of a rational being, though questions like how and to what extent the concept of freedom is implied by a rational capacity is an assumption that is a faith in rationality. Moreover, the categorical imperative is unconditional in its end as Kant explains when he makes the following comparison: “if I think of a hypothetical imperatives as such, I do not know what it will contain until the condition is stated {under which it is an imperative]. But if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it will contain.” (p.37) In terms of its moral application, Kant argues that there is only one, though he makes mention of three, categorical imperative. The first is “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (p.38). As was discussed earlier, the morality is based in universality, i.e. the good, but what makes Kant’s imperative compelling is that it is both a duty towards an end while remaining open to the means that might bring that about. He describes a “maxim” as a subjective judgment that considers the conditions of the agent and differs significantly from an objective law. As it is based in this reasoned account of the conditions, the categorical imperatives demonstrates how the means can be already implied in the end that is sought. The second categorical imperative mentioned is “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p.46). For the moral agent this imperative places a strong emphasis on recognizing the capacity of every rational being. Unlike objects within the world, freedom is an intelligible concept that regards the thing in itself. This is a principle for all rational beings that not only transpose themselves from their own sensual body but could also do the same in their regard for others. In this way, regarding each as an end rather than a means is a moral principle that remains open. The final categorical imperative is to respect the Idea that “the will of every rational being as making universal law” (p.48). By regarding our own freedom and its capacity to impart itself upon the sensual, the concept of freedom is both useful in the sense that it informs our actions but it also must remain incalculable in order the end of the good in all its possible forms. Throughout all of these expressions of the categorical imperative there is a common theme in its acceptance of the ends rather than the means is a principle of freedom is a necessity of every rational being.
Criticism
Nearing the end of the text, I found the concept of the "realm of ends" to be the least persuasive point. It appeared simply to restate the argument made about the rational agent legislating its own law but only extending further to a utopian ideal of the good. While the categorical imperative retains, or does not injure, the practical aspects of its effect, I feel that the realm of ends is perhaps based in the pure good but would call for a purely intelligible world. In this section, Kant failed to explore what could happen when the laws of others conflict with our own but also how the existence of others provides the foundation for any moral exchange to occur. Though there is an apparent gap in this section, it has become clear that many of his comments centered on the experience of a rational being and not its relational context (though the categorical imperative is based in some extent on keeping that aspect of experience open). While there is an emphasis to think of the other as an end, it could easily be a figment of the imagination as there is no requirement for the other to actually exist in relation to a good will. In considering what we will as universal law, does Kant intend us to ask and live as through our maxim were law, or is this effort already taken up within reason itself?
Conclusion
The completeness of Kant’s theory is not so much the greatest concern, for he admits the limitations of knowing the intelligible order that our moral judgment emerge from. Rather it is in what he calls the “duty” to regard other rational beings that makes Kant’s categorical imperative a possible moral basis. For when we rely on particulars examples or consensus to inform the principles of moral agency, it is at that moment that morality ceases to be a possibility for the other whom we have yet to regard. Kant’s intelligible perspective shows that our capacity to transpose ourselves into the experience of the other is the condition which makes morality a possibility.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
PHIL4205 - "The Open" by Giorio Agamben
Today's discussion centered around Giorgio Agamben's The Open which explored the production of the concept of man through a number of strategic divisions, or caesure, of human and non-human beings. The arguement followed several obscure historical examples ranging from biblical to schorlary references to themes of escotology arranged in a number of lightly brushed commentary. Professor Jowette enouraged us to look for the continuity between all of the short passages contained in The Open suggesting that there was a common thread connecting them together - a challenge which I have yet to fully come to terms with.
The difficulty I found was that Agamben does state really clearly in plain terms what he means. One rare occassions, usually at the end of a passage, he leaves us with a striking statement which is not explored in further depth - we are to understand his meaning from the examples leading up to the appearence of the statement. Often, we are compelled to follow a series of propositions, all of which center around the human preoccupation with categorizing/defining what can be called animal and consequently what must be man. I do not gather the sense that Agamben means to simply survey the historical record of these instances of "framing" the animal in language and narrative simply for proof of its historical validity. What I believe is at work in Agamben's writing is something much more profound which makes an attempt to seperate man from the imposition of logic on being - which is neither human nor animal but exists as a link between the two that remains nameless and tends to change with the contingencies of any historical context. In looking at eschotological themes, what is concieve of as the totality of historical progress or the end of logical contradictions, not only are the distinctions present in the production of man disolved but in the space this leaves behind an openness to what he calls the "bare being" that is neither the sole possession of human or non-human.
At the begining of the text, Agamben argues that man has long been at odds with his animal origin. From the depictions in Genesis, we see a version of man who has turned away from the paradise of nature - now aware of his nakedness in the world he seeks to cover himself with leafs and then the skin of animals. By the process of naming the species of animals, as Aquaintus suggests, Adam conducts an experiment where man forms himself out of the ordered animal. Agamben provides further examples where the production of "man", defined as a being distinct from "animal", has been a significant preoccupation in a variety of cultures and historical contexts. Man, as seperate from animal, is a being that is able to know itself. But this knowledge, as Agamben indicates, has been a negative knowledge forged only in his relation to animal.
Although I am likely wrong in my assessment of the details of Agamben's arguement and what he means by "bare being" or role that logic has plays in escotological narratives, he nonetheless wants us to consider the machine(s) work to produce these distinctions in order that "we might, eventually, be able to stop them" (p.38). The end goal, still unclear to me, maybe is not such a weighty arguement - perhaps he is posing the possibility for another form of logic that is not so human centric wherein man does not inflict violence to the animal within himself.
It may better serve Agamben's ideas if, for a moment, we take time to understand what he means by the "anthropology machine". Two major philosophers in particular, whose theories were mentioned by Agamben in The Open, have aided particularly in my understanding of what he refers to as the "anthropology machine".
Hegel's theory of dialectics has often been perhaps the best know arguement for historical change (tilling the soil for Darwin and other historicist thinkers to come). According to the interpretations of Hegel by Kojeve, the ultimate progress of history is dependent on the tension brough about by a "negation" of animality. According to this understanding, history emerges out of the remains left in the clash between these two opposing factors. So long as man resist nature, he maintains himself as master over it. But Hegel's view of dialectics points to the final completion of this process - a point of posthistory wherein all of the contradictions have been worked out and man, as he is know through the resistence to nature, is no longer the antagonist. Kojeve notes that Hegel's meaning of posthistory is not to suggest that man ceases to exist but that he exists as animals are in their orientation to the world. From this model we see that the "machine" is a mere process, affected by its determination towards its particular end. For Kojeve, we need not ask "where is history leading to?" for this is already a factor in play in the present. The exclusion of animality provides the basis for the machine - and in the end, through an ironic dialectical twist, the master becomes the slave.
The Foucault notion of "biopower" offers another perspective of the machine in operation. Particularly in the modern world, this distinction of man from non-human is a difficult gesture to isolate - for it is the principle strategy through which social institutions have their basis. The machine itself has produced a variety of narratives to provide the answer to the question of man - most notably metaphysics and its notion of man as composed of body and soul. Through culture, religion, and political association these various narratives are used to manage all manner of beings based on their physicallity. It is in this management, that the full scope of biopower is revealed for in controlling the movement of bodies we have in a sense harnessed their power - not in excerting force but in the constant seizures divisions and caesurae that is all encompassing.
This anthropological machine has obscured our view of "bare life" and set in place a force of division that is neither human nor non-human in nature, the possibility of a posthistorical man lays bare all that is uncharacteristically man. I shall explore this concept in depth at another time.
The difficulty I found was that Agamben does state really clearly in plain terms what he means. One rare occassions, usually at the end of a passage, he leaves us with a striking statement which is not explored in further depth - we are to understand his meaning from the examples leading up to the appearence of the statement. Often, we are compelled to follow a series of propositions, all of which center around the human preoccupation with categorizing/defining what can be called animal and consequently what must be man. I do not gather the sense that Agamben means to simply survey the historical record of these instances of "framing" the animal in language and narrative simply for proof of its historical validity. What I believe is at work in Agamben's writing is something much more profound which makes an attempt to seperate man from the imposition of logic on being - which is neither human nor animal but exists as a link between the two that remains nameless and tends to change with the contingencies of any historical context. In looking at eschotological themes, what is concieve of as the totality of historical progress or the end of logical contradictions, not only are the distinctions present in the production of man disolved but in the space this leaves behind an openness to what he calls the "bare being" that is neither the sole possession of human or non-human.
At the begining of the text, Agamben argues that man has long been at odds with his animal origin. From the depictions in Genesis, we see a version of man who has turned away from the paradise of nature - now aware of his nakedness in the world he seeks to cover himself with leafs and then the skin of animals. By the process of naming the species of animals, as Aquaintus suggests, Adam conducts an experiment where man forms himself out of the ordered animal. Agamben provides further examples where the production of "man", defined as a being distinct from "animal", has been a significant preoccupation in a variety of cultures and historical contexts. Man, as seperate from animal, is a being that is able to know itself. But this knowledge, as Agamben indicates, has been a negative knowledge forged only in his relation to animal.
Although I am likely wrong in my assessment of the details of Agamben's arguement and what he means by "bare being" or role that logic has plays in escotological narratives, he nonetheless wants us to consider the machine(s) work to produce these distinctions in order that "we might, eventually, be able to stop them" (p.38). The end goal, still unclear to me, maybe is not such a weighty arguement - perhaps he is posing the possibility for another form of logic that is not so human centric wherein man does not inflict violence to the animal within himself.
It may better serve Agamben's ideas if, for a moment, we take time to understand what he means by the "anthropology machine". Two major philosophers in particular, whose theories were mentioned by Agamben in The Open, have aided particularly in my understanding of what he refers to as the "anthropology machine".
Hegel's theory of dialectics has often been perhaps the best know arguement for historical change (tilling the soil for Darwin and other historicist thinkers to come). According to the interpretations of Hegel by Kojeve, the ultimate progress of history is dependent on the tension brough about by a "negation" of animality. According to this understanding, history emerges out of the remains left in the clash between these two opposing factors. So long as man resist nature, he maintains himself as master over it. But Hegel's view of dialectics points to the final completion of this process - a point of posthistory wherein all of the contradictions have been worked out and man, as he is know through the resistence to nature, is no longer the antagonist. Kojeve notes that Hegel's meaning of posthistory is not to suggest that man ceases to exist but that he exists as animals are in their orientation to the world. From this model we see that the "machine" is a mere process, affected by its determination towards its particular end. For Kojeve, we need not ask "where is history leading to?" for this is already a factor in play in the present. The exclusion of animality provides the basis for the machine - and in the end, through an ironic dialectical twist, the master becomes the slave.
The Foucault notion of "biopower" offers another perspective of the machine in operation. Particularly in the modern world, this distinction of man from non-human is a difficult gesture to isolate - for it is the principle strategy through which social institutions have their basis. The machine itself has produced a variety of narratives to provide the answer to the question of man - most notably metaphysics and its notion of man as composed of body and soul. Through culture, religion, and political association these various narratives are used to manage all manner of beings based on their physicallity. It is in this management, that the full scope of biopower is revealed for in controlling the movement of bodies we have in a sense harnessed their power - not in excerting force but in the constant seizures divisions and caesurae that is all encompassing.
This anthropological machine has obscured our view of "bare life" and set in place a force of division that is neither human nor non-human in nature, the possibility of a posthistorical man lays bare all that is uncharacteristically man. I shall explore this concept in depth at another time.
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