Today in our final class, we read the story of Job with the intention of asking what the story says about knowing the Other. The Christian tradition has often favored the interpretation that the story provides an account of how Christian faith reconciles the understanding of God as "good" with the realities of evil in the world. In a way, Job's faith through suffering gestures towards what is left when all things material have been stripped away leaving only what the soul has constituted. But is the suffering without justification an illustration of faith that is to be imitated? Who among us would choose to be tested in this way?
The description offered of the human condition by this biblical story echo many of the themes within existential philosophy. What might be called "negative" meaning attests to Job's own rational of faith that excludes the concept of reward as a basis for understanding one's relation to God. Alternatively, Job's three comforters Eliphaz the Temanite, Zophar the Naamathite, and Bildad the Shuhite urge him to search within himself for what he had done to anger God and bring upon his punishment, for indeed if God is just then there must be a reason for Job's suffering. Job dismisses his comforters views as not only offence and accusative but he sees it as ultimately empty way to understand man's relation to God.
I found it interesting that Job speaks of his obedience to the law, a fact that God agrees with and even boasts about in chapter one when he turns to Satan and says "Have you considered my servant, Job? For there is none like him in the earth, a blameless and an upright man, one who fears God, and turns away from evil" (Job 1:8). Indeed, there is no question of Job's obedience to God and even takes extreme precautions like burning offerings for his children in case any had "renounced God in their hearts" (Job 1:5). All these descriptions of Job provide evidence of his righteousness which goes further to emphasize the fact of his innocence. Even the reader knows after reading the dialog between God and Satan that Job's suffering was for indeed for nothing, or at most a wager that neither God nor Satan had anything at sake except their pride. Though Job would have been justified to curse God having fulfilled the law only to receive punishment, he instead asks "why?". God appearing from out of a "whirlwind", emerging out of chaos, asks Job "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding." (Job 38:4) This among a series of other questions posed to Job contrast the difference between omnipotent and human being. Ultimately, Job can only admit his inability to understand God and in doing so receives his praise for speaking truthfully.
I believe the story highlights may of the tensions that form our relation to the irreducible Other. While we are always seeking to understand we cannot make any claims to knowing the Other. Job's comforters merely assumed to know God, the absolute Other, and his justice as a reward system. I find it interesting the Job's comments were often directed at God posing questions and stating his grievances while his comforters only accused Job of his many unknown indiscretions. The irony is that the comforters provide no comfort to Job in his suffering who must always defend his innocence. In accusing Job the comforters sooth the anxieties about their assured salvation through obedience to the law. These are two contrasting ways of addressing the Other. To the comforter Job as the Other, who is close in proximity, receives no sympathy while Job in his regard for God, the absolute Other, treats him with the utmost compassion given the severity of the injury caused. Perhaps we can take a lesson from this story and what it has to say about the relation to the Other; one cannot truly know the Other no matter how close or separated we might be but in our relation to the Other we recognize ourselves as Others.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Monday, March 23, 2009
PHIL 3476 - On Relating to Others
Today in class we discussed the differences between Sartre's and De Beauvoir's account of the Other. While Sartre maintains a conflicted view of the relation to the Other, which he describes as "hell" in his play No Exit, De Beauvoir has a much more sympathetic view of the relation to the Other as a possibility that occurs because of our existence in the world. Despite their differences both describe the existential condition that forces us to acknowledge the existence of Others.
One could make the argument that the differences between Sartre's and De Beauvoir's regard for the Other differs in their consideration of ethics. While Sartre's radical individualism has secured him the title of the last true "Cartisian Rationalist" and concieves of the conscious "self" as seperate from the Other, De Beauvoir's consideration of the relation to an Other places ethics within the frame of existential philosophy. I am somewhat resistant to these valuations not only on the principle that doing so understates the similarities by too sharp a contrast, but that existential philosophy at its foundation is a recognition of the individual in their life that is not based on any fixed or given meaning. As such, we must recognize that both Sartre and De Beauvoir are describing different but equal perspectives in their closeness to the subject of existence.
The two thinkers share equal perspectives of the same phenomena of existence. Sartre can be said to describe it from the perspective of the "self" while De Beauvoir describes it from the perspective of a self that has been "othered". Either way you consider existence it is still the result of "being" under consideration. For Sartre the Other existing in the world places constraints on the individual will - not merely in a physical sense but in the consciousness for-itself being aggravated by the Other who makes the self notice its own separation. He describes this condition as a kind of subjegation to the Other whose "gaze" judges and makes apparent what is incalculable and external to the self. We are transformed into objects of the Other's will and have no control over how, or if, they regard us. Alternatively, De Bouvoir, from the perspective of the self that has been Othered, considers what the self is left with in its relation to Others. While there is a limit to the possibility of what the self can impose on the Other, it ultimately must accept the freedom of the Other in order for the possibility affirm its own freedom of transcendence outside itself. According to De Bouvoir, the recognition of this solidarity between the self and Other is not only the first point of departure for any transcendence but the very condition of one's own existence which originates in the ethical relation.
Unlike objects in the world, conscious beings are in a constant state of transcendence. From the Sartrian perspective this transcendence occurs in and through the resistance of an Other, while De Beauvoir recognizes the irreducibility of the Other that comes from a recognition of individual subjectivity or freedom. While I think there are notable differences in the temperament between the two philosophers, the Other still is part of the ongoing narrative of transcendence within existence - its limit or possibility. The Other is both a point of resistance and the result of a collective relational being. It is because of the irresolvable relation to the Other that the individual can have the possibility of existence as being-in-the-world.
One could make the argument that the differences between Sartre's and De Beauvoir's regard for the Other differs in their consideration of ethics. While Sartre's radical individualism has secured him the title of the last true "Cartisian Rationalist" and concieves of the conscious "self" as seperate from the Other, De Beauvoir's consideration of the relation to an Other places ethics within the frame of existential philosophy. I am somewhat resistant to these valuations not only on the principle that doing so understates the similarities by too sharp a contrast, but that existential philosophy at its foundation is a recognition of the individual in their life that is not based on any fixed or given meaning. As such, we must recognize that both Sartre and De Beauvoir are describing different but equal perspectives in their closeness to the subject of existence.
The two thinkers share equal perspectives of the same phenomena of existence. Sartre can be said to describe it from the perspective of the "self" while De Beauvoir describes it from the perspective of a self that has been "othered". Either way you consider existence it is still the result of "being" under consideration. For Sartre the Other existing in the world places constraints on the individual will - not merely in a physical sense but in the consciousness for-itself being aggravated by the Other who makes the self notice its own separation. He describes this condition as a kind of subjegation to the Other whose "gaze" judges and makes apparent what is incalculable and external to the self. We are transformed into objects of the Other's will and have no control over how, or if, they regard us. Alternatively, De Bouvoir, from the perspective of the self that has been Othered, considers what the self is left with in its relation to Others. While there is a limit to the possibility of what the self can impose on the Other, it ultimately must accept the freedom of the Other in order for the possibility affirm its own freedom of transcendence outside itself. According to De Bouvoir, the recognition of this solidarity between the self and Other is not only the first point of departure for any transcendence but the very condition of one's own existence which originates in the ethical relation.
Unlike objects in the world, conscious beings are in a constant state of transcendence. From the Sartrian perspective this transcendence occurs in and through the resistance of an Other, while De Beauvoir recognizes the irreducibility of the Other that comes from a recognition of individual subjectivity or freedom. While I think there are notable differences in the temperament between the two philosophers, the Other still is part of the ongoing narrative of transcendence within existence - its limit or possibility. The Other is both a point of resistance and the result of a collective relational being. It is because of the irresolvable relation to the Other that the individual can have the possibility of existence as being-in-the-world.
Thursday, March 19, 2009
PHIL4205 - Derrida and Levinas on Responsibility
If the word "responsibility" does not make you cringe then you probably have not had to endure the agony of being responsible. On occasion you can find me slacking off from my duties either at school or home which may give the impression that I have found a way to live comfortably indifferent to the subject. This is far from the truth. I am always conscious of the responsibilities I have failed to meet both past and present, they haunt me like the ghosts of Ebenezer Scrooge that force him to relive what he had once cast out. It can at times be overwhelming how a guilty feeling can swell up and make suspect a tranquil moment. I can never evade responsibility.
Responsibility always seems to involve an other of some sort whether they are the one who benefit, suffer, or judge my actions. Without the existence of the other could responsibility really be possible or meaningful? Is it possible to be responsible for myself in any way that didn't involve an other? What about irresponsibility? Is it merely failing to deliver on a promise? A thoughtless act at an other's expense? Or is it a lack of relating to an other?
After posing the former questions, I could not help but look towards my own life for examples of where the intention of evading actually reinforced a feeling of responsibility. For instance, when I first started this blog it was merely to get into the practice of writing on a consistent basis. It was because of my own shame as a writer, the inadequacy of my being "as such", that encouraged me to stop dwelling in disappointment of the naivety of self-denial. At the point when I felt I had finally broke-in these new shoes, I suddenly came to the realization that nothing I had written was for me but rather it was for others. It was my only critic/reader Gary Smith (a.k.a The Ontological Boy) who brought this into focus for me. He questioned first my "philosophy", as crudely sketched out as it is, and pointed out continuities between my subjects and writing style. There was often a sense of elation in our exchanges for a month. Each response was followed by a more thought provoking one until I finally withdrew to silence. I did so not because of any offence I felt in Gary reading my work, nor any fatigue from the labor involved, but because I knew that there was the real possibility that I would in the future disappoint the other - I would once again fail to live up to my responsibility to him. As I remained in silence, Gary continued to write daily and comment on my work, sometimes leaving a staggering 30 posts in one month. The comments and posts seemed to urge me to respond, but I remained in my silence. Although we never knew each other, or the many other Others who might stumble across this blog, this unlikely and impossible relationship continued to be a source of judgment that placed my contributions into perspective. One never writes to oneself but always for the purpose of addressing others. This withdrawal brought on by the tremendous debt of responsibility felt in proximity is something to this day I can never hope to repay.
I was strangely comforted by two texts from class, Levinas' Otherwise Than Being and Derrida's Gift of Death. The two essays spoke to me about responsibility, Levinas from an operational account and Derrida from an absolute account of responsibility.
Levinas in Otherwise Than Being explains that our passivity or susceptibility to an irreducible Other places us in a position of responsibility which we would have not chosen or willed for ourselves. In this relation to an Other, a relation that comes before the concept of an "I" or "self" can be formed, we are in Levinas' words "innocent" but also "accused", "persecuted", and held "hostage" by this Other. This responsibility does not come from an appeal to moral virtues such as duty or honor; rather we are responsible to the Other because it addresses us first and has priority over the "self". The relation to Other as pre-ontological separates ethics from morality which is a later phenomena formed in concepts. Levinas also describes the relation to the Other asymmetrical. In coming always before me, asymmetry of the relation to the Other comes in the way it makes demands before we respond. We only come to the point of responding when in proximity to the "face" of the Other. In such a way we are forced into a position of responsibility to respond. Though the ways we respond to the Other may vary, it is always something owed to the Other. The responsibility to the Other is a key component to what Levinas has to say about alterity and its role in the formation of self. It is because of the Other that I can have the experience of things outside of the self. In terms of transcendence and its role in being, "in the face of the Other, I always demand more of myself". This formulation of responsibility radically changes the focus on ethical philosophy away from the active, conscious, self, and places it instead with the Other who places us in the position of responsibility.
Derrida in his essay Gift of Death reinterprets the story of Abraham as an example of responsibility. We might think it is strange that Abraham is used as an example of what it means to be responsible because from most accounts he is acting irresponsibly in agreeing to murder his son. Taking off from Kierkegaard assessment of the story as confirmation of subjective truth, Derrida interprets Abraham's decision to sacrifice Isaac as illustrating the paradox of responsibility. Abraham is torn between being faithful to God and the love of his only child. No matter which he obeys he must at the same time sacrifice the other. Moreover, in committing the act of murder he is violating moral law. Our responsibility for the Other in Derrida's view, whether the absolute Other (God) or a more immediate other, is always without justification and irresolvable but it is the basis from which the foundation of ethics is laid. Proximity is not as vital for Derrida as it is for Levinas. From Derrida's perspective there is always an Other no matter how remote they may be. In choosing to feed the cat that lives in my home or the hundreds of strays, I have no valid reason to privilege one act from another. Professor Jowett often repeats a quote from Derrida that I've grown fond of from this essay: "every Other is every bit Other". At the last moment, with his arm raises to strike
Isaac, the angel of God held Abraham back. In sacrificing that which is closest and which is loved over to the Other, Abraham in return recieved Isaac. It is in giving up our entitlement to sacrifice, which is always unjustified and inadequate, we learn to be grateful for the Other in its Otherness.
In terms of what this all means for my earlier questions about irresponsible, I am never at any time without responsibility. That is however not a sentence to a predestine fate that I can inadequately address or sufficiently justify my actions but rather it is a consequence of my being here in the world. As a closing remark, I've begun the work of completing and publishing the posts from my period of silence. Thank you for everything Gary.
Responsibility always seems to involve an other of some sort whether they are the one who benefit, suffer, or judge my actions. Without the existence of the other could responsibility really be possible or meaningful? Is it possible to be responsible for myself in any way that didn't involve an other? What about irresponsibility? Is it merely failing to deliver on a promise? A thoughtless act at an other's expense? Or is it a lack of relating to an other?
After posing the former questions, I could not help but look towards my own life for examples of where the intention of evading actually reinforced a feeling of responsibility. For instance, when I first started this blog it was merely to get into the practice of writing on a consistent basis. It was because of my own shame as a writer, the inadequacy of my being "as such", that encouraged me to stop dwelling in disappointment of the naivety of self-denial. At the point when I felt I had finally broke-in these new shoes, I suddenly came to the realization that nothing I had written was for me but rather it was for others. It was my only critic/reader Gary Smith (a.k.a The Ontological Boy) who brought this into focus for me. He questioned first my "philosophy", as crudely sketched out as it is, and pointed out continuities between my subjects and writing style. There was often a sense of elation in our exchanges for a month. Each response was followed by a more thought provoking one until I finally withdrew to silence. I did so not because of any offence I felt in Gary reading my work, nor any fatigue from the labor involved, but because I knew that there was the real possibility that I would in the future disappoint the other - I would once again fail to live up to my responsibility to him. As I remained in silence, Gary continued to write daily and comment on my work, sometimes leaving a staggering 30 posts in one month. The comments and posts seemed to urge me to respond, but I remained in my silence. Although we never knew each other, or the many other Others who might stumble across this blog, this unlikely and impossible relationship continued to be a source of judgment that placed my contributions into perspective. One never writes to oneself but always for the purpose of addressing others. This withdrawal brought on by the tremendous debt of responsibility felt in proximity is something to this day I can never hope to repay.
I was strangely comforted by two texts from class, Levinas' Otherwise Than Being and Derrida's Gift of Death. The two essays spoke to me about responsibility, Levinas from an operational account and Derrida from an absolute account of responsibility.
Levinas in Otherwise Than Being explains that our passivity or susceptibility to an irreducible Other places us in a position of responsibility which we would have not chosen or willed for ourselves. In this relation to an Other, a relation that comes before the concept of an "I" or "self" can be formed, we are in Levinas' words "innocent" but also "accused", "persecuted", and held "hostage" by this Other. This responsibility does not come from an appeal to moral virtues such as duty or honor; rather we are responsible to the Other because it addresses us first and has priority over the "self". The relation to Other as pre-ontological separates ethics from morality which is a later phenomena formed in concepts. Levinas also describes the relation to the Other asymmetrical. In coming always before me, asymmetry of the relation to the Other comes in the way it makes demands before we respond. We only come to the point of responding when in proximity to the "face" of the Other. In such a way we are forced into a position of responsibility to respond. Though the ways we respond to the Other may vary, it is always something owed to the Other. The responsibility to the Other is a key component to what Levinas has to say about alterity and its role in the formation of self. It is because of the Other that I can have the experience of things outside of the self. In terms of transcendence and its role in being, "in the face of the Other, I always demand more of myself". This formulation of responsibility radically changes the focus on ethical philosophy away from the active, conscious, self, and places it instead with the Other who places us in the position of responsibility.
Derrida in his essay Gift of Death reinterprets the story of Abraham as an example of responsibility. We might think it is strange that Abraham is used as an example of what it means to be responsible because from most accounts he is acting irresponsibly in agreeing to murder his son. Taking off from Kierkegaard assessment of the story as confirmation of subjective truth, Derrida interprets Abraham's decision to sacrifice Isaac as illustrating the paradox of responsibility. Abraham is torn between being faithful to God and the love of his only child. No matter which he obeys he must at the same time sacrifice the other. Moreover, in committing the act of murder he is violating moral law. Our responsibility for the Other in Derrida's view, whether the absolute Other (God) or a more immediate other, is always without justification and irresolvable but it is the basis from which the foundation of ethics is laid. Proximity is not as vital for Derrida as it is for Levinas. From Derrida's perspective there is always an Other no matter how remote they may be. In choosing to feed the cat that lives in my home or the hundreds of strays, I have no valid reason to privilege one act from another. Professor Jowett often repeats a quote from Derrida that I've grown fond of from this essay: "every Other is every bit Other". At the last moment, with his arm raises to strike
Isaac, the angel of God held Abraham back. In sacrificing that which is closest and which is loved over to the Other, Abraham in return recieved Isaac. It is in giving up our entitlement to sacrifice, which is always unjustified and inadequate, we learn to be grateful for the Other in its Otherness.
In terms of what this all means for my earlier questions about irresponsible, I am never at any time without responsibility. That is however not a sentence to a predestine fate that I can inadequately address or sufficiently justify my actions but rather it is a consequence of my being here in the world. As a closing remark, I've begun the work of completing and publishing the posts from my period of silence. Thank you for everything Gary.
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